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Cpt(P) David A. Schlueter, JAGC 
" Congress has a constitutional duty to protect military personnel 
from quasi-civilians moving among them with a known license to commit 
service-connected crimes without fear of court-martial punishment." 1 
In October 1979, Congress exercised its "con-
stitutional duty" -its long-recognized powers 
of control of the armed forces. 2 It amended 
Article 2 the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
to provide for court-martial jurisdiction over a 
wide range of individuals who might not have 
otherwise baen considered service members for 
purposes of personal jurisdiction. The amend-
ment cuts to. the heart of a number of contro-
versial Court of Military Appeals decisions 
which had voided enlistments on a variety of 
grounds. 3 
Although the amendment appears to settle 
some jurisdictional issues, it also raises a num-
ber of new legal issues and practical problems. 
Some of these issues have been raised and de-
cided before under other jurisdictional argu-
ments. Others remain untested. Before address-
ing a variety of issues which counsel may ex-
pect to see litigated, we turn first to the statute 
itself. 
The Amendment 4 
Article 2, U.C.M.J. was amended as follows: 
( 1) by inserting " {a)" before "The" at the 
beginning of such section; and 
(2) by adding at the end thereof the follow-
ing new subsections : 
(b) The voluntary enlistment of any person 
who has the capacity to understand the signifi-
cance of enlisting in the armed forces shall be 
valid for purposes of jurisdiction under subsec-
tion (a) of this section, and a change of status 
from civilian to member of the armed forces 
shall be effective upon ·the taking of· the oath 
of enlistment. 
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, a person serving with an armed force 
who-
(1) submitted voluntarily to military au-
thority; 
(2) met the mental competency and mini-
muin age qualifications of sections 504 ~P<t 505 
of this title at the time of voluntary submission 
to military authority; 
(3) received military pay or allowances; 
and 
(4) performed military duties; · 
is subject to this chapter until such person's 
active service has been terminated in accord-
ance with law or regulations prom~lgat~d .. by 
the Secretary concerned. 5 
The changes resulted from. hearings con-
ducted in 1978 and 1979 by the Senate Armed 
Services Committee on the continuing problem 
of recruiter misconduct. During its inquiry, fhe 
committee learned of the Court of Military 
Appeals' position on fraudulent enlistments.' In 
the committee's report on the proposed amend-
ments, the "serious" problem created for the 
military by those decisions was addressed. In 
language which clearly i~di~ates'the 'tenoro{ 
its intent, the committee stated.:. 
Several instances came to the commit-
tee's attention where accused military 
members raised the issue of recruiter mal-
practice after commission of an offense, 
succeeded in obtaining a ruling of no juris-
. diction, and were thereupon returned to 
duty for a time (before administrative 
separation could be effected) completely 
immune from military discipline. This situ-
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ation is made intolerable in the case of 
alleged recruiter malpractice by the fact 
that the burden of proof on the j urisdic-
tional issue shifts to the government after 
being raised by the accused, forcing the 
government to prove that there was no 
recruiter malpractice many months or 
years after the fact, with the recruiter 
miles away or out of the service. The com-
mittee learned that in many instances 
accused military members were simply dis-
charged after raising the defense because 
of the difficulty of affirmatively proving 
that the enlistment was valid, thereby es-
caping just punishment for their offenses. 6 
The proposed changes may be best character-
ized, as did the committee,- as the Grimley pro-
vision (Subsection (b)) and the constructive 
enlistment provision ( Subs~ction (c)). 
Subsection (b) establishes criteria for a 
"valid" enlistment under Subsection (a) of 
Article 2. 7 If the individual possesses the 
"capacity to understand the significance of en-
listment in the armed forces" and voluntarily 
enlists, that individual is considered amenable 
to jurisdiction. In proposing this amendment 
the committee intended to overrule the rule in 
United State[! v. Russo, 8 that an enlistment 
could be voided if a recruiter had intentionally 
effeCted a fraudulent enlistment .. The 'amend-
ment is not intended to condone recruiter mis:-
feasance or malfeasance 9 but rather to reaffirm 
the Supreme Court's decision in In re Grimley. 10 
Subsection (c) codifies the doctrine of con-
structive enlistment: If for any reason there is 
an "invalid" enlistment the individual effects a 
constructive enlistment at the time the four 
criteria are satisfied-notwithstanding any 
statutory or regulatory disqualification.11 Ac-
cording to the committee, this section overrules 
the 1'estoppel" theory which had in the past 
prevented the Government from relying on a 
constructive enlistment rationale when showing 
personal jurisdiction. 12 It also overrules those 
decisions which held that an uncured regulatory 
disqualification could ·prevent a constructive 
enlistment. 13 
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Issues 
The statutory changes to the litigation of 
personal jurisdiction will surely raise a multi-
tude of questions and interpretations in the 
coming years-a bold challenge for the litigator. 
Some of the questions are predictable. Others 
are more subtle and may, as often happens in 
the area of personal jurisdiction, be absorbed 
by larger issues. What follows is a brief discus-
sion of a variety of issues that counsel will 
probably see raised in personal jurisdiction 
litigation under the new amendment. 
A. Retroactive Application. 
One of the first questions which must be 
addressed is the possible retroactive effect of 
the amendment. There is no specific guidance 
on this point in the amendment itself or the 
published legislative history. Absent such spe-
cific intent, the law generally presumes only 
prospective application. The statute may none-
theless be applied retroactively if it is not ex 
post facto. Here, the amendment was intended 
to change jurisdictional rather than substantive 
law; it does not now make criminal what was 
once lawful. Another point is that the amend-
ment was intended to codify long-standing prin-
ciples of enlistment law. 4 
Although the discussion here does not address 
the myriad permutations of the retroactively 
question some general points for analysis pur-
poses can be made. First, in analyzing the 
retroactively question three dates should be 
considered: 
Effective date of amendment-9 November 
1979; 
Date of enlistment (subsection (b)); 
Date of constructive enlistment (subsection 
(c)). 
If the amendment is considered wholly retro-
active and applicable to all persons now on 
active duty, then the dates are of little, if any, 
import. However, a more conservative approach 
might be to address the retroactivity issue only 
after first determining. whether the enlistment, 
before 9 November, was in fact void under the 
Russo-Catlow rules. If it was merely voidable, 
then jurisdiction may still be based on recent 
case law predating the amendment and finding 
that voidable enlistments may serve as a valid 
jurisdictional base. 
Assuming that the enlistment was void and 
consummated prior to 9 November, jurisdiction 
may possibly be based upon a finding of con-
structive enlistment after 9 November-the 
estoppel argument no longer being valid. To be 
on the safe side all other alternatives should be 
examined before relying upon retroactive effect 
to provide jurisdiction over a clearly void en-
listment or constructive enlistment occurring 
prior to 9 November 1979.5 
B. Does the Amendment Vest Jurisdiction Over 
Civilians? 
The committee specifically stated that the new 
amendment was not intended to affect civilians 
or reservists not on active duty.16 Rather, it was 
designed to reach "those persons whose intent 
it is to perform as members of the active armed 
forces and who meet the four statutory require-
ments." 17 Any attempts to read the amendment 
as applying to "civilians" would fly in the face 
of Supreme Court decisions which have severely 
limited court-martial jurisdiction over civil-
iansY Of interest, however, is the statement in 
the committee's report that Subsection (c) over-
rules United States v. King. 19 You will recall 
that King was considered by a majority of the 
members of the Court of Military Appeals to 
be an interloper not subject to court-martial 
jurisdiction. King had not executed an enlist-
ment contract nor had he taken any oaths. He 
simply obtained forged travel orders, donned 
a uniform, and served for several months with 
a unit in Germany before the Government dis-
covered his charade and court-martialed him. 20 
The amendment then arguably touches those 
individuals who for one reason or another have 
not executed a formal agreement or oath to 
serve with the armed forces. 21 
This broad application need not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that Congress intends the 
amendment to include civilians. As already 
5 
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noted, the Committee Report specifically ex-
empts civilians. 22 And the wording of Subsec-
tion (c) includes only persons "serving'' with 
the armed forces. The provision turns on "ac-
tual service" or "de facto. status"-the two 
terms sometimes used interchangeably with 
"constructive enlistment" by the courts as a 
basis for jurisdiction.~~ Practically, the King 
scenario occurs only rarely but points counsel 
to the intent of Congress in those situations 
where an enlistment agreement cannot be 
found or there is no proof that an oath was 
given; jurisdiction may still vest when Subsec-
tion (c)'s criteria can be shown. 
C. Competency to Enlist: Statutory and Regu-
latory Disqualifications. 
Has Congress in amending Article 2 indicated 
that it will accept a lower standard or quality 
for competency to enlist? Is a service member 
under 17 years of age at time of trial now 
amenable to jurisdiction? What about Felons? 
Aliens? Can a service member who suffers from 
dyslexia or drug addiction be subject to court-
martial jurisdiction under the amendment? 
Congress could certainly exercise its powers 
and indicate that no longer would there be any 
statutory qualifications to enlist. 24 But it did not 
do so in the amendment and there is nothing in 
the legislative history to indicate that Congress 
was willing to completely abandon a minimum 
standard of competency or capacity to enlist.25 
What then of those not statutorily competent 
to enlist? Although statutory criteria are only 
specifically addressed in Subsection (c), it seems 
safe to assume that jurisdiction under either 
(b) or (c) will vest only over those individuals 
statutorily "competent" to enlist. If a statutory 
defect affecting capacity exists at the time of 
trial then jurisdiction will not vest under either 
Subsection (b) or (c).26 Thus, a sixteen-year old 
service member is not amenable to trial until 
reaching the magic age of seventeen. Statutory 
restrictions on felons, deserters, and those not 
U.S. citizens do not touch "competency" or 
"capacity" to enlist and thus would not invali-
date jurisdiction under either (b) or (c). 27 The 
amendment, however, does vest jurisdiction 
over enlistments where the individual lacked 
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capacity at the inception but the defect was 
cured before trial; there is really nothing new 
here. Absent estoppel, the Government has gen-
erally been allowed to show a subsequent change 
of status under the theory of constructive en-
listment. 28 
What about those service members serving 
with a regulatory disqualification? The amend-
ment does make some changes here. Under 
either Subsection (b) or (c) regulatory defects 
not affecting capacity do not void jurisdiction!9 
The enlistment may of course be voided by the 
government because of the defect but that op-
tion is not available to the service member still 
on active duty at the time of trial (more on this 
later). If the regulatory defect touches "capac-
ity" or "voluntariness' then arguably it may be 
treated in the same manner as a statutory defect 
amounting to a lack of capacity-both with 
regard to Subsection (b) and (c) .00 A service 
member with dyslexia or drug addiction could 
be amenable to jurisdiction under Subsection 
(b) and certainly amenable under Subsection 
(c). 31 An enlistment resulting from the "go to 
Army or go to jail" routine may be involuntary 
under Subsection (b) but later sufficient for 
court-martial jurisdiction under Subsection 
(c) . 32 
D. Recruiter Misconduct. 
The statutory change was intended to over-
rule Russo and its progeny. 33 Recruiter miscon-
duct-even an intentional violation of Article 
84, UCMJ-will not in itself void an enlistment. 
But recruiter misconduct which affects either 
the individual's "capacity to understand the sig-
nificance of enlisting" or "submit voluntarily to 
military authority" may still initially (and in-
directly) void an enlistment. 
For example, where a recruiter successfully 
and intentionally paints a false picture of mili-
tary service for the easily deceived recruit, the 
Government's ability to rely on Subsection (b) 
for jurisdiction may be limited. Whether that 
recruit continued to be deceived would then 
raise additional questions regarding the volun-
tary submission requirement of Subsection (c). 
An accused's statement that he was misled by 
a fast-talking recruiter will no doubt continue 
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to be raised. But, whether after actually serving 
on active duty the accused can raise serious 
questions about his "involuntary" service is a 
different matter. 34 Continued Catlow-type pro-
testations by a recruit may still defeat jurisdic-
tion under both Subsections (b) and (c). 35 
Although emphasis is usually placed upon 
"recruiter" misconduct, litigation has some-
times centered on "government" misconduct.36 
The government will probably still be precluded 
from establishing jurisdiction where the facts 
support the conclusion that the individual, be-
cause of Government actions or inactions, never 
voluntarily submitted to military authority. 
What of the deterrent effect of Russo? Whether 
the Russo decision had the desired "salutory" 
effect 37 of reducing recruiter misconduct is de-
batable. 38 The decision certainly served as a 
potential club to be used by recruiting officials; 
yet continued recruiting pressures reduced its 
effectiveness. The risk of an enlistment later 
being voided and the defect traced to a specific 
recruiter was simply not sufficient as a deter-
rent. Important to note here is that Congress 
by providing jurisdiction over fraudulent en-
listees is not condoning recruiter malpractice. 39 
E. Public Policy. 
The amendments to Article 2 represent Con-
gress' position on public policy. The committee 
was disturbed by the doctrines and problems 
spawned by the Catlow-Russo decisions and so 
stated: 
The committee strongly believes that 
these doctrines serve no useful purpose, 
and severely undermine discipline and 
command authority. No military member 
who voluntarily enters the service and 
serves routinely for a time should be 
allowed to raise for the first time after 
committing an offense defects in his or her 
enlistment, totally escaping punishment for 
offenses as a result. That policy makes a 
mockery of the military justice system in 
the eyes of those who serve in the military 
services. 40 
Ironically, the same theme was expressed by 
Judge Cook in United States v. Torres. 41 Judge 
Cook concurred in the conclusion that Torres 
was not subject to court-martial jurisdiction 
because of intentional recruiter misconduct but 
noted that he could no longer support the Russo 
public policy argument: 
Plainly, the Russo doctrine has been used 
to destroy the public policy it was designed 
to promote. As the public policy considera-
tions perceived in Russo have been per-
verted, not promoted by its sanction, I 
believe the rule it imposed must be aban-
doned.42. 
Is public policy still a consideration in liti-
gating personal jurisdiction questions? Yes, but 
not in the image of Russo. The amendment now 
expresses the public policy that individuals may 
not escape punishment because of the miscon-
duct of a recruiter. But that policy exists only 
where the service member is competent and 
voluntarily serves. The amendment should not 
serve as a signal to recruiters that anything 
goes. 
F. Effect of Notice to Government of Defective 
Enlistment. 
One of the points made in the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals decisions of United States v. 
Valadez 43 and United States v. Wagner 44 was 
that notice to the Government of a defective 
enlistment could operate on "behalf of an accused 
to void jurisdiction. The amendment includes 
language in Subsection (c) which provides that 
jurisdiction under that provision continues until 
the period of service has been "terminated in 
accordance with law or regulations promulgated 
by the Secretary concerned." 45 This is consis-
tent with existing law which indicates that 
status continues until discharge.46 But, it goes 
further. It in effect negates any language in 
Valadez and Wagner which would defeat per-
sonal jurisdiction once an individual has given 
notice to the Government prior to the commis-
sion of an offense. In theory this provision pro-
vides jurisdiction over those persons who are 
in the process of being discharged for any 
variety of reasons, including a defective enlist-
ment, when they commit an offenseY 
7 
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G. Establishing Jurisdiction. 
The amendment changes little for the govern-
ment's overall burden of establishing that an 
accused is subject to court-martial j urisdic-
tion.48 The Ale! 49 pleading burden remains. 
And it is safe to say that the requisite quantum 
of proof will remain the same. 5° However, some 
of the practical problems normally associated 
with litigating the issue should vanish. In the 
large majority of the cases, the recruiter will 
not be called; whether the recruiter assisted the 
recruit in concealing a defect or passing a test 
will be irrelevant. 
When the defense raises the spectre of a de-
fective enlistment the Government may meet 
that challenge in several ways. First, the Gov-
ernment could establish a prima facie case by 
introducing the enlistment contract itself which 
evidences directly or indirectly the elements of 
Subsection (b). Although the contractual as-
pects of the enlistment appear to be neutralized 
by the amendment, the agreement and oath 
establish a voluntary change of status.51 
Secondly, the Government could of course 
establish jurisdiction under Subsection (b) with 
live witnesses but that would probably require 
the presence of the recruiter or other parties 
who were present when the enlistment was en-
tered-a practice now fraught with problems. 52 
A more desirable course might be to simply 
assume for the sake of argument that the 
accused's enlistment was initially invalid (for 
any reason) and proceed with proof under the 
constructive enlistment provision of Subsection 
(c). Local witnesses and unit records would 
normally suffice to show that the accused is 
now subject to court-martial jurisdictionY It is 
here that the constructive enlistment decisions 
serve as a necessary reference for counsel. In 
the past few years counsel were often not con-
cerned with establishing constructive enlist-
ments. Most personal jurisdiction cases involved 
some form of recruiter misconduct which either 
voided the enlistment under Russo or estopped 
the government from arguing constructive en-
listments under United States v. Brown. 54 Con-
sequently, the large body of law on constructive 
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enlistments often remained dormant. 55 The 
amendment will certainly change that. 
V. Conclusion. 
At first blush, the amendments to Article 2 
moot most of the personal jurisdiction issues 
raised by the Catlow, 56 Russo, 57 and Brown 58 
decisions. Closer analysis, however, leads to the 
safer conclusion that some issues remain and 
newer, perhaps more perplexing, questions are 
raised. Another conservative conclusion is that 
the foregoing issues only scratch the surface. 
The Committee's report-the legislative intent 
if you will-is instructive. 59 But the actual, 
practical, effect of the amendments will be 
determined in the future as the statute is liti-
gated and tested on appeal. In summary, it 
might be helpful to set out a two-step approach 
to analyzing personal jurisdiction questions 
under the recent amendment: 
Was the enlistment invalid at its incep-
tion? If the accused lacked "capacity" to 
enlist or if the enlistment was involuntary 
then jurisdiction may not be based on Sub-
section (b). Recruiter or government mis-
conduct in itself will not void the enlist-
ment. Nor will statutory or regulatory 
defects not affecting the accused's "capac-
ity" invalidate jurisdiction. 
If the enlistment was initially invalid, did 
the accused at some point, prior to trial, 
effect a constructive enlistment? That is, 
notwithstanding any regulatory or statu-
tory defect, were the four criteria of 
Subsection (c) met? If so, the jurisdiction 
exists over the accused. 
For illustration, the two-step process in assess-
ing jurisdiction under the amendment can be 
applied to several scenerios: 
Scenerio 1: Private Jones was sixteen 
when he enlisted for three years ; he lied 
about his age and presented obviously 
forged documents to support his sham. The 
recruiter noticed the fraud, joked about it 
with Jones and then completed the paper-
work. Jones told his commanding officer of 
the defective enlistment but the latter 
ignored Jones' statements. Jones turned 
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seventeen three (3) weeks before com-
mitting the charged offense. 
Analysis: The enlistment was invalid at its in-
ception; Jones, age sixteen, lacked the capacity 
to enlist.60 Therefore, jurisdiction should not be 
based on Subsection (b). The recruiter's mis-
conduct does not void the enlistment nor does 
commanding officer's inaction bar jurisdiction 
under Subsection (c). Whether Jones in a 
period of three weeks established a construc-
tive enlistment will turn on a further step by 
step analysis of the four criteria in Subsection 
(c). 61 
Scenerio 2: PFC Smith (age eighteen) en-
listed in lieu of going to jail-on the 
"advice" of the presiding civilian judge. 
When he filled out the enlistment paper-
work he lied, without the assistance of the 
recruiter, about prior drug use and two 
arrests. He served for one year, success-
fully completed the training cycles, re-
ceived pay, promotions, and excellent per-
formance ratings. On several occasions he ./-
mentioned to his platoon sergeant a desire 
to re-enlist. 
Analysis: Jurisdiction should not be based on 
Subsection (b) due to the initial lack of volun-
tariness. The probable violations of recruiting 
criteria do not void jurisdiction. Jurisdiction 
may, however, be based upon Subsection (c); 
Smith has apparently fullfilled the four cri-
teria.62 
Scenario 3: Private Snats, a twice-con-
victed felon voluntarily enlisted with the 
assistance of recruiter misconduct. Once 
on active duty, however, he protested his 
status continuously. His company com-
mander was in the process of administra-
tively discharging him (defective enlist-
ment) when Snats was caught selling 
heroin. 
Analysis: Snats' enlistment was probably valid 
under Subsection (b). He voluntarily enlisted 
and probably understood the significance of 
enlisting. His post-entry protestations might 
negate finding jurisdiction under Subsection (c) 
if Subsection (b) is determined to be not 
applicable.63 The commanding officer's decision f 
to administratively eliminate Snats does ~ot bar 
jurisdiction; Snats' enlistment may indeed be 
defective under the regulation, and still s~rve 
as basis for jurisdiction under Subsection (b).64 
The foregoing scenerios present a ~ross­
section of some of the more commonly encoun-
tered jurisdiction problems. The problems will 
remain but the solutions should change with 
the amendment to Article 2. 
Whither Russo, Catlow, and Brown? The 
statutory change indicates that Russo and 
Brown have been neutralized. But the volun-
tariness implications of Catlow remain.65 If 
the statute effects the. desired changes in per-
sonal jurisdiction litigation, the military justice 
clock will be set back to a time when litigating 
jurisdiction issues was simpler----'and perhaps 
more certain. Congress has exercised its consti-
tutional duty. What the courts will do with the 
amendment is yet to be seen. 
Footnotes 
1 United States v. Barraza, 5 M.J. 230, 233 (C.M.A. 
1978) (Fletcher, C.J.). Chief Judge Fletcher in writ-
ing this language was not addressing the pure enlist-
ment questions of personal jurisdiction but was 
rather addressing a fact situation involving an in-
voluntary activation of a reservist-a "lazy" reservist 
-who had not raised deficiencies in the government's 
processing of his activation u~til after he . was 
charged. The quote, although appropos,· should not 
be construed as indicating Judge Fletcher's approval 
of the amendment to Article 2. In testimony before 
the House Armed·· Services Committee, he strongly 
opposed any attempts to overrule the Russo 'doctrine 
and its progeny. See Army Times, June 25, 1979, at 
8. The amendment would in his estimation "have the 
effect of sweeping all ·fraudulent enlistments under 
the table." ld. He was joined in opposition to the 
amendment by Mr. Eugene Fidell who also testified 
before the House Armed Services Committee. Those 
supporting the measure included ·the Service Judge 
Advocates General, Judge Cook, who personally 
offered an alternate amendment (see note 42, infra) 
and Professor Robinson Everett. 
2 See e.g., U.S. CONST. art. i § 8, c1 11. (power to 
declare war); id. cl. 12 (power to raise and support 
armies); id. cl. 14 (power to make rules for the 
government and regulation of 'the land and naval 
forces). 
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3 Little would b~· gairied'hereby reiitiga't.lng the merits 
of iimiting personal jurisdiction over those serving 
under a clouded enlistment. The controver~y until 
lately existed primarily among those concerned with 
the day-to-day problems caused"by the decisions. But 
in the past year the decisions took on an added 
dimension as Congress and the press took- a lo~g 
look at the situation. T.l;:l~. AI"mY Times, in an editorial 
titled "Court Malpractice" noted, iner alia, the fol-
lowing: 
The Senate has passed a provision which would 
assure court-mar_tial. jurisdiction . o:ver [fraudu-
lent enlistments]. But Court of Military Appeals 
Chief Judge Albert B. Fletcher Jr. has argued 
that the change would "have the effect of sweep-
ing all :fraudulent enlistments. _under. _th~. t~):lle. 
"It would seem to me that an innocent victim 
trapped by the gov~rnment should ~ot fall under 
the jurisdiction of a military court-~~rtial," he 
said. But another member of th~ three-judge 
court broke ranks in testimony before the sub-
committee. Judge William H. Cook. said he sup-
ported efforts to nullify the Catlow-Russo 
precedent. 
So do we, provided that the 1\nal provisiOn 
overturning the Russo rule is drafted in such a 
way as to protect people who are act)lally the 
victims of recruiter malpractice. A s~ld1~r,. for 
example, might have to raise the. malpractice 
issue within a short period after entry in the 
service or forfeit the right to raise. the argu-
ment later. 
We might have thought a tad more of the 
CMA decision had it. carried its argument to its 
logical, legal conclusion. That is, that because 
the "soldier" really wasn't in the service, the 
Army had no authority to pay, feed, quarter or 
clothe him. Maybe that's silly, but so is Catlow-
Rus~o. 
Army Times, July 23, 1979. 
• The amendment was passed as a part of the Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 1980 (S. 428). Pub. L. 
No. 96-107 (9 Nov 1979) Additional amendments 
were made to Article 36, U.C.M.J. to clarify the 
President's authority to promulgate rules of practice 
and procedure before courts-martial. 
" The amendment's language represents the Senate's 
original version. S13e Congressional Record,' s: 428, 
96th Cong, 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S 7272 (1979). 
The 'House receded during conference to the Senate's 
language. See Congressional Record, 96th Cong, 1st 
Session, 125 dONG. REC. H 9319 (1979). See note 
6 supra. 
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• Senate Report 96-197 Defense Authorization Act, 
1980 (S. 428) at 121 [hereinafter cited as Report]. 
The pertinent portions of the Report are included 
as an Appendix to this article. In commenting on S. 
428, Senator Nunn noted: 
On [the subject of military discipline] the 
committee approved an amendment which we 
feel will improve military discipline. 
The Court of Military Appeals has ruled, under 
the so-called "Catlow-Russo" decisions, that 
where there is· a defect in the service member's 
enlistment, resulting from recruiter misconduct 
or some other factor, that defect deprives the 
court-martial of jurisdiction to try the accused 
for offenses committed in the military. The effect 
is to allow persons who commit offenses in the 
military to go without punishment. This problem 
has been highlighted by all four service chiefs. 
The committee amendment provides that a per-
son becomes subject to military justice by taking 
the Oath of Enlistment or by voluntarily accept-
ing military duties and military pay. This is not 
a provision to condone recruiter malpractice but 
simply provides that those who commit crimes 
in the military should be subject to military 
justice. Congressional Record, 96th Cong, 1st 
Session, 125 CONG REC, S 7290 (1979). 
And in its report to ·the House, the Conference 
Committee on S. 428 stated: 
The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 801) 
intended to improve military discipline by limit-
ing the right of an accused to raise defects in 
the eniistment process to defeat court-martial 
jurisdiction, and to clarify the President's au-
thority to issue a manual of procedure not only 
for trial procedures, but pre-trial and post-trial 
procedures as well. 
The House amendment has no similar provi-
sion. 
The House recedes. 
The House conferees were reluctant to take a 
step which might be misinterpreted as providing 
further encouragement to an already serious 
recruiting malpractice problem. However, it is 
inappropriate to addess the issue of malpractice 
in a court-martial proceeding. 
The conferees agree that the current manage-
ment technique of using recruiting quotas has 
increased the likelihood of recruiting malpractice. 
The Secretary of Defense is urged to review the 
management of recruiting in the military services 
and to consider an alte.rnative approach to the 
current quota system. 
10 
The conferees have also agreed that a more 
effective administrative process to permit en-
listees to raise questions of the validity of their 
enlistment is necessary. The conferees expect the 
Secretaries of each of the services to establish 
an administrative process that will provide each · 
enlistee a voluntary opportunity to raise any 
improper matters in his or her enlistment, as 
well as permit service management to uncover 
recruiting malpractice. The general framework 
of this process shall permit an enlistee at the 
end of his basic training period, or at a simi~ 
larly appropriate point, the opportunity to raise 
such matters. 
The service secretaries shall report back to 
each of the Committees on Armed Services by 
December 31, 1979 on the process that will be 
established to uncover recruiting malpractice. 
Congressional Record, 96th Cong, 1st Session, 125, 
CONG. REC. M. 9319 (1979). 
7 See note 4 supra. 
• 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975). 
• The committee specifically noted that the amendment 
was not intended to "suggest that recruiter malprac-
tice be tolerated, but reliance should be placed on 
prosecution under Article 83 and 84, and on adminis-
trative reforms to solve [the problem of recruiter 
malpractice]." Report supra note 6 at 122. 
10 137 u.s. 147 (1890). 
11 See notes 25-29 infra and accompanying text. 
12 The estoppel theory found its genesis in United 
States v. Brown, 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974), 
gained momentum in United States v. Russo, 1 M.J. 
134 (C.M.A. 1975) and peaked in United States v. 
Harrison, 5 M.J. 476 (C.M.A. 1978). The estoppel 
doctrine prevented the Government from relying on 
a constructive enlistment where it had acted un-
fairly in enlisting an individual. The committee in-
tended to overrule those portions of Brown, Harrison, 
and Russo which acted to estop the Government. See 
Report supra note 6 at 122. 
13 The amendment was also intended to "overrule that 
portion of United States v. Valadez, 5 M.J. 470 
(C.M.A. 1978) which stated that an uncured regu-
latory defect not amounting to a lack of capacity or 
voluntariness prevented application of the doctrine of 
constructive enlistment." Report supra note 6 at 122. 
10 Report supra note 6 at 122. See also Schlueter, The 
Enlistment Contract: .A Uniform Approach, 77 MIL. 
L. REV 1, 56-60 (1977). In Post v. United States, 
161 U.S. 583 (1896), the Supreme Court distinguished 
between statutes affecting substantive law, procedure, 
and jurisdiction, the latter two not conside.red under 
the ex post facto proscription. Cf. Putty v. United 
States, 220 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1955) cert. den. 350 
U.S. 821 (1955) (change in court's jurisdiction was 
ex post facto as a defendant). 
"Whh just a pinch of imagination one can readily see 
th~ potential for, at least in theory, a whole host of 
new issues in litigating personal jurisdiction issues. 
The Department of the Army position is that the 
amendment is permissibly retroactive to all persons 
now on active duty. DA message 131800Z (13 Nov. 
1~79). Preliminary indications are that the Navy 
will take the same position. Any attempts of course 
to "retry" or relitigate an earlier finding of no 
jurisdiction over an individual who is awaiting a 
discharge would be barred by either law of the case 
or res judicata principles. See O'Donnell, Public 
Policy and Private Peace-The Finality of a Judicial 
Determination, 22 MIL. L. REV. 57 (1963). 
16 Report supra note 6 at 122. 
17 ld. 
"See e.g., United States ex rei. Toth v. Quarles, 350 
U.S. 11 (1955) (no jurisdiction over discharged sol-
dier); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (no juris-
diction over civilian dependents accompanying armed 
forces overseas during peacetime); and Grisham v. 
~' Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (no jurisdiction over 
civilian employees in peacetime). 
"11 C.M.A. 19, 28 C.M.R. 243 (1959). 
20 King, an E-1, had received an undesirable discharge 
in February 1958. Only three days later he obtained 
forged orders at Fort Ord authorizing shipment to 
Europe via Fort Dix. He received pay and allow-
ances from March 1958 to July 1958. He was charged 
with fraudulent enlistment, absence without ·leave, 
failure to obey a lawful order, resisting apprehen-
sion, forgery, and possession of a false pass. The 
majority said that the Army was "just the victim 
of a crime committed by a civilian," 28 C.M.R. at 249. 
Judge Quinn dissented and noted that more than a 
"mere passing masquerade by the accused" had 
occurred. He felt that King had procured an actual 
. entry into the service. 
22 Report supra note 6 at 122. 
23 For example, in In re McVey the court noted that the 
petitioner was a de facto soldier because he had 
voluntarily assumed obligations and had attempted 
to secure the rights of a serviceman. And in United 
States v. Julian, 45 C.M.R. 876 (N.C.M.R. 1971) the 
court rejected the argument that the accused was not 
subject to court-martial jurisdiction because he had 
been intoxicated when he enlisted. The accused was 
subject to jurisdiction because he was in ''actual" 
service. Neither decision however, discussed "con-
... ,\ structive enlistment" which has normally been asso-
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ciated with implied contracts. See King, supra note 
20 and accompanying text. 
•• See e.g., United States v. Williams, 302 U.S. 46 (1937) 
where the Supreme Court recognized the authority of 
Congress to determine who was eligible to enlist. 
'"10 U.S.C. § 504 (1970) provides: 
No person who is insane, intoxicated, or a de-
serter from an armed force, or who has been 
convicted of a felony, may be enlisted in any 
armed force. However, the secretary concerned 
may authorize exceptio.ns, in meretorious cases 
for enlistment of deserters and persons con-
victed of felonies. 
Failure to meet all statutory qualifications does not 
necessarily render one incompetent to enlist. It would 
be safe to say that Congress intended to provide for 
jurisdiction over those meeting the age and mental 
requirements-those requirements mentioned in Grim-
ley. See also United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461 
(C.M.A. 1978). Note that Subsection (b) only re-
quires a voluntary enlistment by "any person who 
has the capacity to understand the significance of en-
listing .... " Therefore, a felon who enlists could be 
subject to jurisdiction under Subsection (b) and sub-
section (c). And although 10 U.S.C. § 3253 (1970) 
requires that only U.S. citizens (or those lawfully 
admitted to the United States for permanent resi-
dence) may enlist, an alien could be subject to juris-
diction under both subsections (b) and (c). Part of 
problem in analyzing the effect of the amendment is 
adjusting to the proposition that jurisdiction under 
the new Article 2, UCMJ is not always linked with 
what in the past was considered to be a valid en-
listment. 
26 This conclusion is supported by the Committee's 
Report which specifically mentions the situation in-
volving an individual not meeting the minimum age 
requirements at the time of enlistment but who later 
successfully enters into a constructive enlistment. 
Report supra note 6 at 123. 
27 ld. Apparently those under the current statutory age 
of seventeen do not possess the capacity to "under-
stand" the significance of enlisting in the armed 
forces under Subsection (b). Arguably felons, de-
serters and those not U.S. citizens can understand 
the significance of enlisting. Historically, for example, 
lack of citizenship did not always defeat jurisdiction. 
See e.g., Ex parte Beaver, 271 F. 493 (N.D. Ohio 
1921); Ex parte Dostal, 243 F. 664 (N.D. Ohio 1917). 
'"See e.g., United States v. Harrison, 5 M.J. 476 
(C.M.A. 1978). 
"As with the statutory defects, the Grimley rationale 
adopted by Congress seems to apply only to those 
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regulatory controls which touch the individuals 
"capacity" and render the individual non sui generis. 
See also United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461 (C.M.A. 
1978). The Report mentions only two requirements 
for a valid enlistment under Subsection (b): capacity 
and voluntariness. The criteria of Subsection (c) do 
not mention regulatory qualifications. Report supra 
note 6 at 122. 
"'Id. 
31 Dyslexia and/or drug addiction could conceivably 
defeat jurisdiction under either Subsection (b) or (c) 
if such defects continually rendered the individual 
non sui generis or prevented formation of a voluntary 
enlistment. As a practical matter in only a rare case 
would either of those regulatory defects prevent a 
constructive enlistment under Subsection (c). 
32 This hypothetical is specifically mentioned in the 
Report supra note 6 at 123. But note that if the 
choice of "army or jail" was prompted by the ac-
cused, his family, or counsel then the resulting enlist-
ment will not necessarily be "involuntary." See United 
States v. Lightfoot, 4 M.J. 262 (CMA 1978); United 
States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461 (CMA 1978). 
33 See note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
34 In the past if the Government could not satisfactorily 
establish the absence of recruiter misconduct, it failed 
on two counts: The enlistment w.as usually considered 
void ab initio under Russo and the Government could 
not show formation of a constructive enlistment. 
Now, recruiter misconduct is, in itself, a neutral 
factor. Assuming that the Government cannot suc-
cessfully rebut allegations of the deceived, innocent 
recruit, in all likelihood the Government will be able 
to show that .at some point before trial, the accused 
voluntarily served and thus is subject to jurisdiction 
under Subsection (c). A recent Navy Court of Mili-
tary Review decision emphasizes the potential prob-
lems. In United States v. Hurd, M.J. -- (N.C.M.R. 
25 Sep 1979) the accused was deceived; he unsuccess-
fully protested, and then served for one and one-half 
years. The court held the enlistment "involuntary" 
and estopped the Government from arguing construc-
tive enlistment because of its inaction in correcting a 
recruiting abuse. See also notes 51 and 63 infra. 
Under the amendment, jurisdiction could be estab-
lished over Hurd-like cases under subsection (c). 
35 The "continued-protestation" point was specifically 
made in the Report supra note 6 at 123. Note that 
in Catlow, the accused registered his protests through, 
among other methods, repeated AWOL's. Will a 
one-time verbal protest work? Probably not-espe-
cially if the length of service covers an extended 
period of time. 
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311 See e.g., United States v. Marshal, 3 M.J. 612 
(N.C.M.R. 1977), where the actions/inactions of a 
clerk in a Recruit Training Regiment were the 
equivalent of Government misconduct. See also United 
States v. Brown, 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974) 
where company commander had not acted properly 
after notice that accused was underaged. 
"'United States v. Russo, 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975) 
at 136. 
38 See note 42, infra and accompanying text. The amend-
ment was passed by Congress amidst wide-spread 
recruiter misconduct investigations, which has re-
sulted in almost three hundred individuals being re-
lieved from recruiting duty. 
39 Report supra note 6 at 122. See also the Conference 
Committee Report and Senator Nunn's remarks at 
note 6 supra. 
40 Report supra note 6 at 121. The Conference Com-
mittee Report, also note 6 supra, was to same effect. 
Historically, public policy considerations generally 
weighed in favor of the Government. See Enlistment 
Contract, supra note 14 at 46-49. 
41 7 M.J. 102 (C.M.A. 1979). 
42 7 M.J. at 107. Judge Cook's position was based on his /,--
"personal" observations of the Russo-related prob-
lems. He further noted that his observations have 
been confirmed by the "Army Chief of Staff and other 
senior officials before the Subcommittee on Manpower 
and Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee." 
I d. 
'"5 M.J. 470 (C.M.A. 1978). 
« 5 M.J. 461 (C. M.A. 1978). Both Valadez and Wagner 
were discussed in Wagner, Valadez, and Harrison: 
A Definit-ive Enlistment Trilogy?, The Army Lawyer, 
Jan. 1979 at 4. 
.uArticle 2(c), U.C.M.J. 
46 See United States v. Hutchins, 4 M.J. 190 (C.M.A. 
1978). 
"Recall that the Congressional intent was to avoid 
the situations where individuals could be immune 
from prosecution before a discharge would be exe-
cuted. See note 6, supra and accompanying text. 
"See e.g., Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 
(1887); United States v. Barrett, I M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 
1977). 
., See United States v. Alef, 3 M.J. 414 (C.M.A. 1977). 
50 See United States v. Bailey, 6 M.J. 965 (N.C.M.R. 
1979) where the Navy Court of Military Review in ,r 
an en bane decision addressed procedure and burden 
of proof questions. If the accused's status is not an 
underlying element of the charged offense (e.g. 
AWOL, desertion) then the question of personal 
jurisdiction is decided by the military judge, as an 
interlocutory matter, applying a standard of prepon-
derance of the evidence. However, if status is an 
underlying element, the issue is decided first by the 
judge using a preponderance of the evidence standard 
and then by the members using a beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard. 
51 The enlistment contract normally includes a statement 
of understanding between the parties: recruit and 
Government. The actual contractual facets of the en-
listment are not essential to determining jurisdiction. 
Military courts have traditionally emphasized that 
jurisdiction is based on status, not contract. In recent 
years more "contractual" language found its way 
into enlistment decisions. See e.g., United States v. 
Russo, 1 M.J. 134, 137 (C.M.A. 1975) (common law 
contract principles applied). 
Will a breach of contract by the Government defeat 
jurisdiction? No. Applying the Grimley rationale, 
now codified, a breach of contract will not relieve the 
accused from court-martial jurisdiction. See United 
States v. Bell, 48 C.M.R. 572 (A.F.C.M.R. 1974) 
(breach of contract argument rejected as defense to 
AWOL). See also Dickenson v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317 
(lOth Cir. 1957) The accused's charge of breach of 
contract may impact, however, on the issue of "volun-
tariness," essential to finding jurisdiction under either 
Subsection (b) or (c). See e.g., United States v. Hurd, 
-- M.J. -- (N.C.M.R. 25 Sep 79) where the 
court found no jurisdiction over service member whose 
enlistment contract had been changed, without his 
knowledge, to reflect a different training specialty. 
He came on active duty after officially and unsuccess-
fully protesting several times. The Court said that 
his enlistment was involuntary and that Government 
inaction estopped it from showing that he had entered 
a constructive enlistment in one and one-half years 
of service. Under the amendment the Government 
would not be estopped. This case clearly points out 
that strong equities often exist in favor of the accused 
and that the Government must continue to ferret out 
irregular enlistment practices. See note 6 supra for 
Conference Committee Report to that effect. Defense 
counsel faced with this problem should urge that 
simply accepting pay, performing duties, etc., does not 
establish voluntary service. The longer the period of 
service, the tougher the task of showing involuntary 
service. 
52 See note 6 supra and accompanying text. 
53 If jurisdiction is to be grounded or Subsection (c) 
under a constructive enlistment, then the validity of 
the enlistment, ab initio is of secondary concern. 
Using local resources, i.e., the accused's commander, 
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NCO's, and Military Personnel Records Jacket 
(MPRJ) should simplify matters for the Government. 
<» 23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974). 
"See e.g., United States v. Wagner, 3 M.J. 898 
(A.C.M.R. 1977) aff'd 5 M.J. 461 (C.M.A. 1978) 
(discussion of constructive enlistment); See also 
Constructive Enlistments: A live and Well, The Army 
Lawyer, Nov. 19767 at 6. 
56 23 C.M.A. 142, 48 C.M.R. 758 (1974). 
57 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975). 
""23 C.M.A. 162, 48 C.M.R. 778 (1974). 
,. See Appendix (Extract of Senate Report 96-197) 
and note 6 supra (Conference Committee Report). 
"
0 See notes 26, 27 supra and accompanying text. 
01 The problem is close. Whether three weeks is sufficient 
to establish a constructive enlistment could go either 
way. Five (5) days service was held to be insufficient 
in United States v. Williams, 39 C.M.R. 471 (A.B.R. 
1968). 
"'This scenerio presents elements of probably the most 
common enlistment problem-a regulatory deficiency 
coupled with recruiter misconduct followed by a con-
structive enlistment. 
" This scenerio might arise in situations approximating 
those of the recent decision in Hurd, supra notes, 34, 
51. Special care must be given to these types of not 
cases. Although recruiter misconduct may no longer 
be the key issue in litigating jurisdiction, the related 
problems of changed training requirements, assign-
ments, and other enlistment promises should be ex-
pected. The mere breach of the enlistment contract 
should not defeat jurisdiction. However, where the 
Government has obviously deceived the recruit, as in 
Hurd, jurisdiction will probably rest on subsection (c) 
only if the servicemember actually served voluntarily 
after discovering the deceit. Note that in Hurd it 
was apparent that the designated training blank on 
the enlistment form had been changed from hospital-
man (H--) to mess management (MS). To reach 
its result, the Court in effect held that Hurd's oath 
and enry into the delayed entry program was voided 
by the discovery, 1 month later, that something was 
amiss. 
Note that if the enlistment is valid under subsection 
(b), that is, it was voluntary and the individual had 
the capacity to enlist, then subsequent "involuntary" 
service will not defeat jurisdiction. Superficially, 
however, involuntary service casts questions on the 
voluntariness of the initial entry onto active duty. 
"See notes 6, 46 supra. 
65 See note 32, supra and accompanying text. 
